


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
CSI BATTLEBOOK 1-A

REAR AREA OPERATIONS  
REAR AREA SECURITY

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On 26 October 1950, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment took over security of a supply dump at Kojo, Korea. They were surprised by an attack from organized North Korean units. Two companies were cut off, finally managed to fight off the attack and regained contact with their battalion after losing 27 killed, 39 wounded and 3 missing.

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*Dr. B. S. Bravac*

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REPORT OF STUDY

REFUGEE AREA SECURITY

THE TERRITORY DIVISION

24 NOVEMBER - 10 NOVEMBER  
1968

Prepared by Staff Group A, Section 1

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U.S. ARMY COMBAT STUDIES INSTITUTE

U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

APPENDIX

1. **REFUGEE CAMP** - **FORWARD SECURITY** - **1st Battalion, 5th Marines**, **1st Marine Division**.

2. **REFUGEE CAMP** - **FORWARD SECURITY** - **1st Battalion, 5th Marines**, **1st Marine Division**, **1st Marine Regiment**, **1st Marine Division**, **1st Marine Division**.

3. **REFUGEE CAMP** - **FORWARD SECURITY** - **1st Battalion, 5th Marines**, **1st Marine Division**, **10th Division**.

**REFUGEE CAMP** - **FORWARD SECURITY** - **1st Battalion, 5th Marines**, **1st Marine Regiment** took over security of a supply dump at KODO, Korea. They were surprised by an attack from organized North Korean units. Two companies were cut off. Carroll managed to fight off the attack and reestablish contact with their battalion after losing 23 killed, 47 wounded and 4 missing.

This is a good example of a combat unit detailed to a rear area security mission engaging an organized enemy force. Because the N.K. 5th Division remained in the area, the analysis will go further than the ROKC battle and investigate the difficulties encountered in securing the supply route during the first week in November 1950.

**REFUGEE CAMP** - **FORWARD SECURITY** - **Appleton, Roy E.** South to the Nakdong, North to the Yalu. Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1961.

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6. Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 36, No. 4, April 1952.

7. Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 36, No. 5, May 1952.

8. Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 36, No. 6, June 1952.

9. Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 36, No. 7, July 1952.

10. Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 36, No. 8, August 1952.

11. Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 36, No. 9, September 1952.

12. Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 36, No. 10, October 1952.

13. Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 36, No. 11, November 1952.

14. Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 36, No. 12, December 1952.

15. Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 37, No. 1, January 1953.

16. Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 37, No. 2, February 1953.

17. Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 37, No. 3, March 1953.

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21. Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 37, No. 7, July 1953.

22. Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 37, No. 8, August 1953.

23. Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 37, No. 9, September 1953.

24. Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 37, No. 10, October 1953.

25. Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 37, No. 11, November 1953.

26. Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 37, No. 12, December 1953.

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THE GARDEN IS 1000 ACRES

## FIGURE 1 - MARINE DISPOSITIONS AT 1951

### FIGURE 3 - MAGNETIC PERIMETER

Figure 4 - MAJON-NI AND ROAD TO KURE

## HISTORICAL OF KOJO

This is the story of the Battle of KOJO with the  
United Marine Division. It is a historical view at what  
can be termed as a rear area protection mission which  
should be better known as part of our military tactical  
structure. The analysis of the mission and the mission  
is surrounded by a complete examination of the situation,  
the concept of the operation, the combat service  
support received by the Marines at KOJO and the  
command area, as well as the command and signal that  
were available and used during the action from 21  
October to 13 November 1950 in the country of Korea  
during what has been commonly termed the Korean War.

### I. SITUATION.

#### a. General Overview:

(1) The near disastrous setbacks suffered by  
the US and South Korean forces during July and August  
1950 dramatically reversed the following month by  
a highly successful amphibious operation at INCHON by  
the US Army Corps. So successful was the operation  
that General MacArthur announced the liberation of  
Korea on 15 September, less than a week after the  
invasion began. Having severed the North Korean supply

and communication lines, the operation resulted in the rapid collapse of the North Korean offensive. While a few enemy units were able to retain integrity and unroute US forces, enemy activities were mainly limited to delay and withdrawal to the north.

MacArthur was quick to capitalize on his success by ordering his fleet north to cut off and destroy withdrawing North Korean forces. As part of this plan, the 1st Marine Division, which had taken part in the initial landing, was to be transferred by sea to the northeast coast of Korea in support of the offensive to the north.

(2) The plan originally called for an assault landing in WONSAN since Republic of Korea (ROK) army elements, moving northward, were well south of the city and encountering scattered resistance from forces withdrawing north. Just as the initial planning had been completed, information was received by the 1st Marine Division that ROK army elements had rapidly advanced north and seized and passed through WONSAN enroute to PYONGYANG to the north. As a consequence, the plan was changed from an assault to an amphibious landing. While underway, the 1st Marine Division received additional changes to the mission, to include sending one battalion, immediately upon landing, to KODA, 35 miles south of WONSAN.

a. Task Organization:

1.000 - TA 0211  
1st Marine Regiment (-),  
Forward Command Group  
1st Bn, 1st Marine  
2d Bn, 1st Marine  
F Btry, 2d Bn, 11th Marine  
1 Plat, 4.2" Mortar Co  
1 Plat, Co C, 1st Engr Bn  
Det, Co D, 1st Med Bn  
2 Plats, 22d Co., 5th KMC Bn  
75mm FG Plat, AT Co  
Det, Anglicos, 1st Sig Bn  
HAGON-NI (TA 3830)  
3d Bn, 1st Marine  
D Btry, 2d Bn, 11th Marine  
1 Plat, 4.2" Mortar Co  
Company C (-), 1st Tank Bn  
TOKWON (TA 5936)  
1st Marine (-), Rear Command Group  
Co C (-), 1st Engr Bn  
1 Plat, 22d Co, 5th KMC Bn  
Det, MP, Hq Bn  
Det, Admin Sec, 1st Bn, 1st Marine  
Det, Admin Sec, 2d Bn, 1st Marine  
Det, Admin Sec, 3d Bn, 1st Marine

b. Enemy Situation:

- (1) The enemy order of battle during these operations ran the gamut from retreating North Korean rifle divisions, attempting to thread their way through the 1st Marine Division's zone in order to rejoin the never abandoning North Korean People's Army (NKPA), to a shattered army from which the remnants of an entire division surrendered to US forces at HAGARU-RI. Such a tall, unorganized and skillfully led, though undisciplined, NKPA units were encountered defending.
- (2) To determine the 2d, 5th, and 15th NKPA battalions, it is necessary to take into account the following: withdrawing units may never have been engaged; the initial attack and capture reports indicated

On 10 October 1950, during the Battle of UNGBOK-RI, approximately 14,000 North Korean troops were captured. This statement can be made because it is known the number of stragglers and deserters who surrendered in civilian clothing, and were usually accepted throughout the area as local citizens or United Nations prisoners returning to their homes. In addition, some equipment in the organized units consisted of light machine guns and small crew-served weapons and different amounts of ammunition that could be easily identified. Rifles, machine guns and mortars were common. The stragglers and deserters, dressed in civilian clothing, carried no weapons.

(2) North Korean units specifically identified were the 45th, the 48th, and the 50th Regiments of the 15th NKPA Rifle Division which had successfully withdrawn to the north following the United Nations (UN) offensive of 15 September 1950, and had moved to the MAJON-NI area where it was to remain until the Communists commenced their counteroffensive on 20 October 1950. Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) crossed the Yalu River in late October 1950. Other North Korean divisions identified during the UNGBOK-RI Offensive included the 5th, 7th, and 11th NKPA Divisions, elements of which participated effectively against the Marines in the WONSAN - CHONJU-MARINE Supply Route (MSR) area and against US Marine Corps in the KOREA RIVER. These forces were committed for the aggressive and effective in part due to

The 9th, 11th, 12th, 13th and 15th NKPA Divisions were the first NKPA units to invade South Korea and were largely composed of troops who had previously served with the CCP in China.

(3) The Chinese Communist order of battle included units from the 3d and 4th CCF Field Armies, veterans of both the fighting against the Japanese in World War II and against the Chinese Nationalists following that war. The general plan for the employment of enemy forces within the 1st Marine Division's zone was the assignment of one army, the 42d CCF Army of the 13th Army Group, 4th Field Army, to a delaying action south of the CHOSIN and FUSEK Reservoirs, while bringing up the larger and more effective forces of the 3d CCF Field Army to launch a counteroffensive. The 124th Division of the 42d Army had the specified mission of delaying the advance of the Marines along the HAMHUNG-HAGURU-RI axis.

c. Weather: With the summer over, temperatures would often reach into the high 40's, though it was not uncommon for temperatures to drop into the 20's and lower 20's at night. Towards the latter stages of this operation, it would drop close to zero degrees Fahrenheit at night. The day that the 1st Marine Division completed their administrative amphibious assault across the MUNGBIN, it was in the lower 30's at and

and 10 miles (15-20 mph) had increased the wind chill factor. This was the first time Marines had seen ice in Korea. The rice paddies throughout the area had a thin layer of ice as a result of the night time temperatures. However, as winter had not yet arrived, the rice paddies had not had a chance to completely freeze. Consequently, movement through these paddies was always met with mud and moisture which hindered foot as well as vehicle movement. Much of the autumn weather in this region was characterized by minor amounts of precipitation which alternated between a cold, slow drizzle and brief periods of light snow flurries, both of which severely limited visibility.

d. Terrain:

(1) During the WONSAN phase of the 1st Marine Division's operation, it was soon realized that the terrain forced North Korean forces, escaping to the north from the PUSAN Perimeter combat in the south, to focus on the most favorable route. This most favorable route of escape entered the 1st Marine Division's zone in the vicinity of 1000 in the south, continued to the northeast through ANBYON, westward to MAJON-NI and eventually northward exiting the MAJON-NI valley via the primary north-south road. See Figures 3 & 4. From PUSAN to 1000 was 79 miles; WONSAN to MAJON-NI was 25

action. The 1st Marine Division zone was 300 miles north to south and 60 miles east to west. A summary of the terrain characteristics pertaining to the zone of the 1st Marines Regiment (Reinforced), or referred throughout this report as Regimental Combat Team One (RCT-1), focuses on KOJO and MAJON-NI.

(1) KOJO. To date, this was the most attractive area the Marines had seen in Korea; an almost undamaged small seaport flanked by white beaches and clear blue waters of the bay. Surrounding the city of KOJO was a flat coastal plain some four to five kilometers in diameter. See Figures 1 & 2. From the outskirts of the city to the rise of the hills which encircle the seaport was a solid field of rice paddies. Northwest of the city was a long ridge of high ground (which became the 1st Battalion's Command Post (CP) location). This ridge ran in a southwesterly direction from the point where it rose from the beach. (It was later occupied by C Company, 1st Battalion and two platoons of A Company because the positions offered by the terrain were separated by numerous ravines and secondary roads). To the south of the city, and east of the railroad track was Hill 109. It overlooked the ocean and two smaller villages (PANGDONG-NI and HABONGDONG-NI) located along the coast, as well as an extensive open area covered by rice paddies. These ridges and hills, ranging from 150 to 200 feet in

The station is formed by stone walls (or natural perimeter) around KOJO. To the northeast of KOJO was a small peninsula.

(3) The supply dump (the original "defend" objective of 1st Battalion's mission) was located at the railroad station in the flat ground to the south of KOJO. This low point of the terrain could be easily approached by the enemy from numerous directions. The most likely avenues of approach were from the south along the secondary coastal road and through the valley leading towards KOJO from the southwest.

(4) MAJON-NI. Twenty-eight miles inland, to the west, from WONSAN was MAJON-NI, located adjacent to major road junctions for north-south and east-west traffic. This was the main WONSAN, PYONGYANG, SEOUL network. In certain locations, there were altitude differences of over 3000 meters between WONSAN and MAJON-NI. Both of the roads in question had been literally carved out of the walls of barren mountains. In some places, the road had awesome 1,000-foot drop-offs. The roads were generally carved out of the mountains and were made up of loose rocks and boulders. Any travel by road was slow and tedious. Each turn and each bridge represented a potential ambush site.

(5) The village of MAJON-NI is in a "Y"

strategic valley. See Figures 3 & 4. It is completely surrounded by high treacherous mountains that drop sharply into a valley. In the valley, outlined by two streams, is the village of MAJOM-MI, with a population of less than 400 people. The village was a small, perhaps self-sufficient community that, for the most part, had remained unchanged for hundreds of years (due partly to its isolated location within the valley surrounded by huge mountains). Yet the "Y" shaped valley provided possible avenues of approach at each apex of the "Y". In addition, the surrounding mountains were covered with numerous natural drainage defiles that converged into the valley. Each drainage defile represented a potential avenue of approach for small guerrilla enemy forces operating on foot. The surrounding terrain was so imposing that the typical defensive perimeter consisting of a series of outposts would be ineffective. Any defense of this valley would require a coordination of reverse and forward slope positions. Supporting fire for such a defensive scheme would also be adversely affected by the terrain. The supporting artillery/mortar fires would have to be positioned to fire in any direction. With the high ground rising immediately in all directions around the valley, artillery would literally be "firing out of a barrel."

e. Friendly Situation:

(1) Strengths:

(a) MAJON-NI (3/1st Marines):

(1) The unit was at full strength with no equipment shortages because they had landed administratively at WONSAN several days prior and were unopposed during the road convoy to MAJON-NI.

(2) Morale was high as the end of the war appeared in sight with the collapse of the NKPA offensive and exploitation north by the allied forces.

(3) Availability and close coordination of fire support means was a significant factor in the defense of MAJON-NI.

(b) KOJO (1/1st Marines):

(1) The unit was at full strength and equipment authorization.

(2) High morale prevailed due to the anticipated end of the war.

(2) Weaknesses:

(a) MAJON-NI (3/1st Marines):

(1) Narrow defiles and enemy ambushes cut off ground resupply creating shortages of

ammunition, fuel, and rations.

(2) Early onset of winter towards the end of the operation found some elements without winter clothing.

(3) Location in hostile territory created security problems as the area had been under Russian influence since WWII.

(4) Large numbers of refugees and POW's strained the capabilities of the Civil Affairs section.

(5) The mountainous terrain prevented close support by artillery and employment of the attached tank company.

(b) KOJO (1/1st Marines):

(1) Location in hostile territory and large numbers of refugees created security problems.

(2) Company positions were not mutually supporting.

(3) No battalion indirect fire support was available until six hours after the initial attack began.

3. Dispositions:

(a) 3/1st Marines: A perimeter of 3400 meters circumference around MAJON-NI was formed by the three rifle companies, provisional platoons of Headquarters and Service Companies, and artillery and engineer troops. The Battalion CP was located in the center of the perimeter with the artillery battery about 300 meters south of the CP. Since the commanding ground was too far from the village and too rugged for company outposts, daytime observation posts were established and vigorous patrolling of the three main roads was conducted.

(b) 1/1st Marines: Company B occupied outposts three kilometers south of KOJO to cover the southwestern approaches along the coastal road and the road which ran through the valley leading to KOJO. The northern sector immediately adjacent to the west and one kilometer northwest of KOJO was held by A Company; while to the southwest of A Company, C Company's defensive positions were oriented toward approaches from the northwest.

MISSION - MISSION IMPLIES

In mid-September 1950, after successful, routine advances of the North Korean People's Army, pushing them northward and back across the 38th parallel from SEOUL, there developed a pensive moment by the leaders on the ground of both the United Nations' forces and the forces of the Korean Army (ROK). Both General MacArthur and Syngman Rhee believed that they could not, or would not, accept the status quo prior to the North Korean invasion in the previous June. (In retrospect, the controversy over MacArthur's interpretation of his mission and the Joint Chiefs of Staff's authority to push north of the 38th parallel was the seat of the problem.) General MacArthur's strategy was to attack across the 38th parallel with the Eighth (US) Army in the west. To do this, he retained X (US) Corps as a separate operational force under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations' Command. X Corps would conduct an amphibious landing at WONSAN on the eastern coast after the amphibious attack on the western side of the peninsula had been initiated. X Corps would then establish a beachhead, attack with assigned, attached, and organic elements to the west for about 125 miles. The intent was to link up with elements of Eighth Army in the vicinity of PONGDUNG as trapping the remnants of the North Korean army which was retreating. Both the

and the X and V Corps would proceed together. But the command was to be decentralized as far as possible towards the Manchurian border.

b. The details of the concept of operation changed several times during the September-October 1950 time frame. Even with the numerous changes to the initial attack plans, the operation was to be conducted by the US Marines under the command of the X (US) Corps Commander. On 24 October 1950, the Marine commander, under the command of the X (US) Corps, was told that the V Corps had received a planning document indicating that the X Corps Commander would become the sole commander of the occupation forces in Korea north of the 38th parallel and east of the Tokopeck Mountain range. These forces would consist of a single American Army Division - the 3d Infantry Division - and the First Marine Division. The rest of Eighth Army was to return to Japan. This peaceful attitude prevailed throughout the theater from the headquarters of MacArthur to the foxhole of the forces that were present in Korea. The attitude was of peace falling over the land. A chance to go home. The end of the conflict.

c. At the point of the stand-down north of the 38th parallel, the First Marine Division received the following mission from X Corps Operations Order #13, issued at 1250 October 1950:

(1) To land on beaches in the vicinity of WONSAN.

(2) To relieve all elements of I FOF in KODD and zone.

(3) To protect the WONSAN-KODD-MAJON-NI area, employing not less than one Regimental Combat Team (RCT), and patrolling all roads to the west in zone.

(4) To advance rapidly in zone to the Korean northern border.

(5) To be prepared to land one Battalion Landing Team (BLT) in the CHONGJIN area rapidly on order.

(6) To assist the 101st Engineer Group (C) in the repair of the YONGHUNG-HAMHUNG railroad, employing not less than one engineer company.

d. The 1st Marine Division further assigned these tasks to the following units in their Operations Order (O-1) released at 0800 hours on 28 October 1950.

Although this was the formal order, most commanders knew the contents of what was coming in the previous "Operational Directive".

(1) RCT-1 to relieve elements of the I FOF in the WONSAN-KODD-MAJON-NI zone, establish necessary road

prohibited except movement under the general patrol orders, and prohibit emergency moves. RCT-1 to maintain one reinforced battalion at HQD until further orders.

(2) RCT-7 to relieve elements of I (ROK) Corps along the HAMHUNG-CHOSIN Reservoir road, advance rapidly to the northern tip of the reservoir and CHONGJIN, prepared for further advance to the northern border of Korea and to destroy enemy in zone.

(3) RCT-5 to move to an assigned zone behind RCT-1, relieve elements of I (ROK) Corps in the vicinity of FUSON Reservoir, establish necessary road blocks to prevent movement into the area, patrol the roads and destroy the enemy.

(4) BLT 1/5 to be activated on order. Upon activation to report to the designated commander for operational control and landing in the vicinity of CHONGJIN.

(5) The 11th Marines, reinforced and less detachments, from an assembly area in the vicinity of HEDWIGSBURG, be prepared for operating in the zone of any RCT.

c. The mission encl. 1 focuses on the US Marine Reinforced Combat Team 1. See Task Organization on page 1. The members of the 1st Battalion, 1st Marine

the First Battalion to be extracted from the previous mission statement of orders. The battalion was currently at a bivouac near WONGBU airfield. The unit was bivouacked. The unit was at ease with the new mission. They were ordered to HODD and accomplish the mission as it had been stated. A closer look at the mission needs to be made to determine what one can understand more clearly. The intent of the orders from the X Corps and the First Marine Division.

The AT TAN, where it backs into the sea, was a depot. This depot was used by the ROK and the Marines intended to be used by the armed forces that were to come later in the area. The First Marine Division gave the mission to the First Battalion to protect that depot. The intent of the mission as provided by the Division and the Corps was clear. The battalion was to protect the depot and to protect the roads in and out of the area, which included the railroad that led into the depot. As indicated by troops available and the terrain available, there was an insufficient amount of tanks and an irregular land formation for those troops to conduct. The latter problem was compounded by enemy fire concentrations in the area. It was a case of misinterpretation of enemy forces that were present on the plateau, where the Marines were supposed to be positioned. The following is the situation as the commanding officer dictated it to be extracted from the

the First Battalion had been ordered to move to the  
area around Paju. The divisional commander was

notified that the First Battalion received the mission to move  
to the area around Paju and relieve the I ROK forces  
there without protecting the area as it was interpreted and  
without orders from the division. The tanks had  
been withdrawn to surface elsewhere in theater and as  
the terrain did not lend itself to tank maneuver, it  
was determined that the tanks were not needed in Paju.  
As it turned out, this was a good decision and had no  
effect on the situation in the area at all. The enemy  
in the area did not have tanks and the terrain  
restrictions would have prevented their use.

The task was to relieve the I ROK units and  
protect an area consisting of a coastal plain about  
fifteen minutes in diameter which stretched from the bay to  
about twelve miles ranging from 150 to 600 feet in  
width. At the ocean was the depot. The mission to  
protect the depot had not changed. The intent was the  
same as to protect the depot, but the contents of the  
depot had changed by departing ROK forces. Non  
descript, what order had to have changed. With  
regards to the depot, just what was the First Battalion  
expected? The crops were ripe and the roads seemed  
unprotected. On the other hand, the I ROK and the "dem"  
had been there for months. The ROK had to determine

What the mission was. There is no indication that the commander of the battalion asked for clarification of his orders or that he interpreted them any differently than he had when he received them aboard the USS Mount McKinley two days earlier. The intent remained the same - protect the depot.

i. The area that was drawn on the map for the battalion was clear to the commanders of the Marine companies on the ground. (See Figures 1 & 2). They had to spread their companies outside the safety of the mutual support of the adjoining forces. There was no doctrine of the time in the hands of the Marines that indicated there was such a mission as rear area protection, nor was there any statement in the mission or task that would indicate that the units were to conduct a rear area protection mission. Indeed, after having had to land over the beaches and to establish a defense along the railroad and the port cities, it is clear to the person reading the mission that there was no rear area problem of which one could possibly be aware. The situation was not that accurate.

j. But there was an enemy threat to the rear of the battalion. The only way which it could be handled would be to have the friendly forces reorganize on the terrain and to better define the threat that existed. Since there appears to be no doctrine at the particular

Colonel Schmuck substantiated this situation and there  
appeared to be no change of mission for the First  
Battalion, it can only be stated that the battalion had  
to stick to its original course of action and to  
protect the empty depot against the threats of what  
then was considered to be an organized enemy and not  
the errant threat they faced.

b. Marine Lieutenant Colonel Jack Hawkins  
provides a clear interpretation of the mission in which  
the First Battalion was involved. It is recounted from  
his documentation of the area and the mission. It was  
done prior to the knowledge that the depot had been  
emptied by the departing ROK forces.

"Mindful of my mission - to protect the  
supply dump until removed - I had  
disposed the battalion in a way  
designated to accomplish this end. The  
supply dump was located at the railroad  
station in the flat ground south of KOJO  
- a point difficult to defend, since it  
was on the low ground and could be  
approached by the enemy from any  
direction." (1)

(NOTE: LTC B. M. Schmuck assumed command of the 1/1  
from LTC Hawkins on 16 Nov 50.)

The intent of the commander who issued the order was  
fully understood and was not questioned. LTC Hawkins  
and had seen a better way to accomplish the mission.

c. The 2d Battalion, First Marine Division,  
arrived in the ROK, and requested the removal of

recovered and mutually left aboard the ships. The enemy situation did not indicate that the masses would be needed so soon after the first wave of RCT-1 landed at KOJO--particularly since the 1st Battalion landed without incident. However, in retrospect, this reserve would be used. As the 1st Battalion developed the situation on the shore, the Regimental Commander made the important decision to commit the 2d Battalion to KONO to reinforce the 1st Battalion's initial positions. In order to accomplish this task, the battalion was ordered to land over the beaches at PONSON and to use the train to move to KOJO. This was done on 26 October 1950. After arriving in the late afternoon, the battalion boarded the gondola cars of the available Korean train and arrived in KOJO at about 2200 hours. This occurred without significant incident. The battalion commander of the reinforcing battalion understood his mission, was prepared to accomplish it, and did it without misunderstanding. The 2d Battalion tied in with the 1st Battalion thus complementing the efforts of the Regimental Combat Team.

iii. The 3d Marine Battalion was ordered to depart KOREM on 26 October. Its mission was to relieve the 2d RCT Regiment at MAJON-NI. The battalion was given the mission of establishing defensive positions at HUJUNG-RI, preventing any enemy forces that were not moving

to left behind) and to deny the enemy the use of the roads in the area - specifically the complete road network in the area. The mission statement to the Battalion also specified the patrolling of roads to the north, south, and east of MAJON-NI and to keep the road open between MAJON-NI and WONSAN. The overriding significance of the area was characterized by the junction of the roads leading east to WONSAN, south to SEOUL, and north to PYONGYANG. These roads would obviously be used by retreating, or more appropriately, escaping forces of the North Korean Army as they moved back to the north.

b. After a reconnaissance of the area, LTC Thomas L. Ridge, Commander of the 3d Battalion, concluded that the difficult terrain (a 28 mile, steep, twisting road through deep gorges and passes that invited ambushes and landslides which would block the roads) could not be kept open 100 percent of the time, as required in order to accomplish the mission. LTC Ridge received oral orders from the Commander, RCT-1, which actually relieved the battalion from the mission of keeping the WONSAN to MAJON-NI road open. With this modification to the mission, the 3d Battalion understood the mission to be one that consisted of becoming a force for blocking and screening. Because of the size of the area, the battalion perimeter was

established using company observation points. The large spaces between the observation posts were covered by patrols. The primary road network was patrolled, but this was mainly during daylight hours. In retrospect--and with a larger force--it may have been wise to have patrolled at night. Patrolling at night may have been necessary as it may have resulted in a greater degree of success.

b. The attachments that would occur after 28 October should be briefly mentioned so that their mission is understood as their involvement is explained later in the analysis. The commitment of the regimental reserve on 28 October to reinforce the 1st Battalion at KOJO, and the departure of the 3d Battalion to maintain the road network in the MAJON-NI area, resulted in WONSAN, the original landing position and the area that should have remained secure, being left with no security force.

c. Commander, 1st Marine Division, attached the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, as well as elements of the 5th Korean Marine Corps (KMC), to the Regimental Combat Team 1. Their mission was to patrol the roads into the WONSAN area. Additionally, the battalion, as attached, was to maintain blocking positions at ANBYON and to secure the airfield and the harbor at WONSAN. This latter task should require further study to determine

the confidentiality of these attachments, but will not be included in its entirety here.

2. Impact of rear area protection

(1) General. KOJO, MAJON-NI and other actions dedicated to the protection of MSR's were one part of the Corps' campaign in northeast Korea. Each incident affected subsequent battles. For the purpose of this study we will address the general events prior to the 1st Marine Division's administrative landing at WONSAN, the landing itself, and combat actions at KOJO and MAJON-NI. This spans a time frame of 21 October 1950 to 13 November 1950.

(2) Rear Area Security. WONSAN itself was basically within enemy territory. Although the 3d ROK Division advanced far north of WONSAN itself, it trailed long risky Lines of Communication (LOC's). This vulnerability required the 1st Marine Division to move from SEOUL to WONSAN and create a viable supply depot at sea and relieve ROK units. In some ways, the subsequent actions in the KOJO-MAJON-NI-WONSAN area were rear area protection missions in a tactical, mobile, and deep battle from the operational perspective. Furthermore, the threat itself was illusive. The commanders were often unable to identify where their rifle units would meet ROK activists. In addition to these and other reasons, the initial direct involvement of the Chinese Communists in the Korean conflict was

the available information, and the outcome of our battle (UOD) and (MAGINOT).

(B) UOD.

(a) Disposition of Forces.

(1) Enemy. Major opposing forces consisted of the depleted 5th, 7th, and 10th NKPA Divisions, retreating north from their battle positions around the FUSAN perimeter. The retreat was organized, and included harassing actions to disrupt US supply routes. The goal of the retreating North Koreans was to link up with the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) that had already crossed the Yalu River. On 13 October 1950, the first CCF elements of the 4th Field Army came south. By 15 October 1950, 120,000 Chinese veterans were inside North Korea, and by 25 October, one entire CCF Field Army was in the X Corps zone. In general, the NKPA forces were well clothed and equipped; in addition, they relied on automatic weapons and grenades available through heavy combat support. The 5th NKPA Division moved north from the Ap-ki on the FUSAN perimeter to Ch'ang-ch'ri, northeast to Uod, and then west. Its approximate strength was 1000 men and its mission was to support the 7th NKPA and eventually join with CCF forces. This division was manned with combat veterans and had previously served with the CCF in China.

"The infiltration of the Chinese Communists, and  
the forces of Red China, have appeared  
to be a constant and increasing factor of uncertainty  
in the Korean situation, providing in small  
numbers food and fuel--the backbone of  
the Korean civil war. Cited guerrillas by  
name, they were actually outlaws and  
parties forced to no cause. And by  
virtue of their very furtiveness, they  
were capable of doing a great deal of  
damage to organized forces." (2)

(2) Friendly Forces. On 14 October, the 1st Marine Division departed INCHON after being relieved by 8th Army units around SEOUL. Its destination was WONSAN. The Navy began minesweeping operations on 10 October, but the harbor was not completely clear on the Division's arrival in WONSAN Harbor on 20 October. The 1st Marine Regiment (1/1), one of three infantry regiments in the 1st Marine Division, was ordered "to relieve elements of I ROK Corps in WONSAN-KOJO-NAJON-NI zone, establish necessary road blocks to prevent movement into the area, patrol roads, and destroy enemy in zone. RCT-1 to maintain one reinforced battalion at KOJO until further orders." (3) The short warning time precluded detailed coordination or battalion planning. After a successful demonstration landing on 26 October, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines assembled at WONSAN airfield for unit movement to KOJO. At 1330 hours, the first element of the 1st Battalion departed WONSAN for KOJO in two L-19 transports departing at approximately 1400

and supplies were transported along the coast by road and rail were located on a truck  
convoy. The immediate task for 11th to reinforce from  
Korea and protect an area consisting of a coastal plain  
approximately one diameter and a semicircle of hills, 15-  
20 km west in height. With the arrival of the  
regiment, the 5th regiment departed westward for Inchon  
in the afternoon of 27 October. Ironically, the  
supposed task it was supposed to guard was removed by  
the advancing北 Korean. This fact made the 1st  
division's mission somewhat nonsensical, but  
apparently only the South Koreans knew the dump was  
empty. In terms of enemy activity, "they [ROK]   
admitted that small bands of escaping NKPA soldiers had  
sometimes raided the villages for rice, but added that  
S. Korean patrols had scoured the hills without meeting any  
organized resistance." (4)

### (b) Opening Moves.

(1) Although there was no hint of any illegal surveillance activity, the Marines were clearly in violation of the Geneva Convention. The Marine Corps was kept off the island and the men left the Select Committee account of POWC. This was fully expected by the defense, although it had no knowledge of what would happen to the captured POWs. The defense also argued that the Geneva Convention did not apply to the POWs because they were not POWs.

the village. For that reason, he deployed B Company in front of the village approaches. The remainder of the regiment entrenched themselves in surrounding hills to defend the supply depot. (Figures 1 & 2).

LTC Hawkins did not expect an unexpected large enemy force. In such an emergency, it is understandable that B Company would withdraw to the more defensible position. Hawkins' behavior in protecting the supply depot deserves explanation. He ordered his forces before learning that the ROK's had taken the contents of the supply dump with them. For added firepower, the battalion reinforced B Company with light machine guns, 3.2" rocket launchers, heavy machine guns, 75mm recoilless rifles, flame throwers, and 81mm mortars. On the afternoon of 27 October, Hawkins faced an additional burden. Appearing in the valley southwest of KODD, 2000-3000 refugees streamed toward the seaport. Hawkins did not have time to accommodate the refugees before nightfall, so he evacuated them into the peninsula northeast of KODD. At 0600 in the afternoon, 1/1 received probing fire from regimental headquarters. At 1000 hours, a patrol team crossed from Fife Hill 125. (Figures 1 & 2).

At 1000 hours, the regimental headquarters approached and received an order to withdraw to the town of Hwachon. The regimental commander, LTC Hawkins, was killed in action.

1. At 0400 hours, the first North Korean infiltrators were sighted.

2. At 0415 hours, the first infiltrators were seen near the 1st Platoon

area. They were about 100 yards away from the Marines.

3. At 0425 hours, the infiltrators were sighted just west of the 2nd Platoon

area. They were approximately 200 yards away.

#### 4. Shortly after the 1st and 2d

Platoons had been engaged by the infiltrators, the infiltrators attacked C Company. On this attack, the

Marines had infiltrated within grenade distance. They

also fused the Americans by shouting "Come this way!"

and "I shoot! Meine friends!" when challenged.

Surprised, the 1st Platoon of B Company was

surprised by two platoons of North Koreans. Seven

Marines died before they got out of their sleeping

bags. The NKPA attacked 3d Platoon and the B Company

at 0430 hours points to the south and southeast. Three

platoons of communists retreated after barrages of 60mm

and 100mm mortars were concentrated directly

on Marine Machine positions. At C Company, North

Koreans infiltrated within 10 feet of the Marines before

they were driven off. This was the fiercest attack, but C

Company held its ground that night. In the south, B

Company did not fare well. The 2nd Platoon

was killed in their sleep at 0430 and the 1st Platoon

retreated after a barrage of 60mm and 100mm

mortars. At 0500 hours, the infiltrators started an

attack on the 1st Platoon. The 1st Platoon fought back at

The attack of the North Korean infiltrators started during the night of November 21, 1950. The infiltrators were divided into two groups, one under command of Captain Kim Chang-ho and the other under command of Captain Cho Sung-ho. The infiltrators were concentrated in the area around the village of CHONCHON-ri. The infiltrators were estimated to consist of 1st Battalion, 2nd Regiment, 105th Division, and 1st Battalion, 106th Division. The infiltrators were supported by 100-120 men of the 10th Field Artillery, 105th Division. The infiltrators had available forces of 300-400 men, including 100 North Koreans and 200 Chinese. They counted 92 bodies around their positions. In contrast, the North Koreans employed little suppressive fire and relied on surprise. Whistles and trumpets coordinated their efforts, and the Marines judged the attack as being integrated and skilled. The North Korean tactics were similar to those seen in previous battles of the war. For the Marines, it was complete surprise. After the initial surprise, the attack was coordinated, supporting fires quickly followed, and after B Company, retreat was a textbook maneuver. Disregarding the principles of war, the enemy chose to attack to gain a advantage and the Marines chose to defend, despite the lack of security. The Marines fought to protect their comrades, soldiers, and the security of the Republic of Korea. The infiltrators were divided into two groups, one under command of Captain Kim Chang-ho and the other under command of Captain Cho Sung-ho. The infiltrators were concentrated in the area around the village of CHONCHON-ri. The infiltrators were estimated to consist of 1st Battalion, 2nd Regiment, 105th Division, and 1st Battalion, 106th Division. The infiltrators had available forces of 300-400 men, including 100 North Koreans and 200 Chinese. They counted 92 bodies around their positions. In contrast, the North Koreans employed little suppressive fire and relied on surprise. Whistles and trumpets coordinated their efforts, and the Marines judged the attack as being integrated and skilled. The North Korean tactics were similar to those seen in previous battles of the war. For the Marines, it was complete surprise. After the initial surprise, the attack was coordinated, supporting fires quickly followed, and after B Company, retreat was a textbook maneuver. Disregarding the principles of war, the enemy chose to attack to gain a advantage and the Marines chose to defend, despite the lack of security. The Marines fought to protect their comrades, soldiers, and the security of the Republic of Korea.

Report of Engagement - CHONCHON-NI

At 0300 hours, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment (KODO) moved north along the railroad tracks on the beach northeast of town. Still under attack, B Company resumed radio contact with the 4.2" mortars after repairing some destroyed antennae. At 0300 hours, the mortars supplemented fire to cover up the ongoing NKPA attack. For 40 minutes, the artillery was operational, but the right antenna had been hit. If the artillery had reached KODO, it would have been withdrawn. At 0330 hours, the NKPA converged and moved east of the railroad track, about 100 meters towards KODO. B Company resumed withdrawal along the track north of CHONCHON-NI, assisted by A Company. The evacuation was nearly complete when 200 enemy troops moved west out of KODO into an open field of fire. A and B Company, supported by F Battery, fought on wounded NKPA enemy. The engagement finally ended when Maritime Corps completed some uncontrolled demolition missions that forced the NKPA to withdraw.

F. Reinforcement. At 0430 hours, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment transmitted a message to the 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, informing it to move to the railroad tracks and withdraw to KODO. The 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment had been unable to withdraw

around 1700 hours on the 27th by 1000 NKPA. It requested helicopters for evacuation of the wounded and Landing Ship Transport-Hospital (LSTHs) for less seriously injured soldiers. Another message left KOJO around 1800. Basically, it asked "shall we hold here, or withdraw north," requested regimental reinforcement, and finally mentioned that the ROK supply dump was empty. Corps and Division agreed that KOJO should be held, since a large scale NKPA attack seemed likely. Another factor in this decision was the ROK supply dump. McLeod, at the Division CP seemed to know as yet that it had been removed.<sup>(7)</sup> but General Smith, 1st Marine Division Commander, ordered the 1st Marines to send a battalion of reinforcements anyway. Slated for the task was COL Fuller's regimental headquarters and the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines. Using the railroad from WONSAN, the first trains left for KOJO at 1630 hours and arrived at 2230 hours on 28 October. In terms of additional combat support, 1/1 recommended a second destroyer for gunfire support. Since the roads and bridges out of WONSAN were not sturdy enough to hold tanks, 1st Marines also sent an LST loaded with tanks. Finally, the 2d Marine Artillery (-) plus the motor transport of 2/1 was ordered to move to KOJO on the morning of 29 October. "Making up a train and loading it with a reinforced battalion and extra supplies in fifteen and one half hours had been something of a

the 1st Battalion's reserves were all in WONSAN and the convoys and water transport were too slow to assure rapid reinforcement. For all practical purposes, the reinforcement effort was lost energy.

(2) Consolidation. COL Fuller's reinforcement of KOJO left his zone relatively unbalanced. The 1st Marines' major mission was security of the WONSAN beachhead. With the 2d Battalion supporting the 1st Battalion at KOJO, and the 3d Battalion relieving the ROK's at MAJON-NI, there were relatively few troops available to patrol the 105 mile stretch of coastline at ANTHONY. In addition, a portion of the 1st Battalion had been relieved

estimated enemy. For another example, the tanks and the LST's were to land at MONSAN on the 27th and again on 28 October. In a repeat performance, they had aground again on 29 October on arrival at KOJO. For the time a Navy tugboat came to the LST's aid, the tanks were superfluous to KOJO. With the enemy disapperaing into the western foothills, the 1st Marines ordered the tanks returned to MONSAN -- without ever being unloaded. Patrols in KOJO itself and west of the coastal plain were fruitless. The enemy was gone. Even so, in the two days of action, Marine air strikes and Navy destroyers leveled 60% of KOJO. On 30 October, a 1st Battalion patrol moving south from KOJO along the railroad track found the bodies of 12 Marines near Hill 109. As they approached the outskirts of TANGCHON, the patrol received sniper fire. Wasting no time, Corsairs were called again, resulting in the death of 16 more North Koreans. The patrol estimated 50% of TANGCHON was destroyed. This was the last major action in the KOJO operation. Marine casualties were 77 KIA, 27 WIA, and 4 MIA. The Marines estimated enemy losses at 250-300 from an actual body count of 165. Additionally, there were 37 POWs. In this phase, interdicting the slow supply. Field vehicles searched and the supply forces claimed since all bypassed the town and moved northward. Indeed, the intelligence section of the KOJO operation was excellent for

maneuvered) that had the potential to hobble the Marine X Corps operation. Perhaps the 3d Battalion in MAJON-NI deterred the enemy from such an operation.

(4) Relief. It was now clear to the 1st Marines that KOJO was no longer a hot spot in their zone of operations. With the security of WONSAN in mind, the 1st Marine Division sent the 5th KMC Battalion to relieve the 1st Battalion in KOJO. 1/1 vacated KOJO at 0700 hours on 2 November by LST. Arriving at WONSAN at approximately 1230 hours, they took up defensive positions around the city. The 2d Battalion left KOJO by rail and motor convoy on 3 November. After some minor guerrilla contact on the route north, they arrived at WONSAN at 1200 hours on 4 November.

(d) Key Events. The KOJO operation had several key events. The first was the decision to send the 1st Battalion south. With the long LOC's (39 miles from the logistic beach head), relative isolation, and poor command and control, KOJO was a questionable objective to defend. The 1st Battalion Commander contributed to this failure. By placing his companies in defendable positions that did not exist, he directly allowed defeat of B and C Companies, resulting in the destruction of B Company, 100 wounded, and 27 dead. The second decision was made on 24 October to

reinforcement. It was too late with too much of the armor equipment. The excessive artillery and beached armor characterized the ineffective reinforcement effort. All of these events played into the hands of the NKPA. Although estimated enemy losses were high, they successfully disrupted the southern flank of the ROKAR logistic corridor, diverted resources to a noncritical area, and endangered the MSR's.

(e) Outcome. ROKO was a qualified success for the NKPA. Apparently armed with more accurate intelligence than was available to the Marines, they used violent, night tactics to shatter isolated 1st Battalion positions. They quickly broke off the battle when faced with superior firepower. Having already fought up and down the length of the Korean peninsula, the North Koreans used their vast experience to concentrate forces to achieve local superiority and overwhelm the defenses. The Marines were a much heavier force than the NKPA; therefore, reinforcement was slower and less flexible. On the other hand, the North Koreans relied on light machine guns and number; consequently, they did not need to sacrifice an enormous logistic burden. In defense of the 1st Marines, there was insufficient time for them to make preparations and issue orders. This spread confusion on the command level. It was clear that

there was little understanding of the Division Commander's concept for KOJO. The final result was that the communists harassed the Marine forces, interdicted their support LOC's, and blended into the hills in preparation for their linkup with the CCF.

(4) MAJON-NI.

(a) Disposition of Forces.

(1) Enemy. Threat units at MAJON-NI were similar in origin to the NKPA forces that fought the 1st Battalion at KOJO. The major opposing force was the 15th NKPA Division. Although they were also retreating north from the PUSAN perimeter, the unit was a veteran force with CCF experience prior to the Korean conflict. The 15th NKPA Division, under Maj Gen Pak Chun Sol, consisted of three regiments (45th, 18th, and 50th) of uncertain strength. Their mission was occupation and control of the upper Imjin River Valley for unconventional operations. MAJON-NI was one of their main objectives.

(2) Friendly Forces. MAJON-NI was a critical North Korean village for several reasons. In terms of LOC's, it was a major junction in the roads to PYONGTAK, SEUL, and WONSAN (Fig 5). Politically, MAJON-NI was the fiefdom of forced culture in the countryside of the communist puppet state set up

On 19 October, after several days of "R & R" time, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, relieved the 3d Battalion, 11th Marines, at MAJON-NI. The 1st Battalion had been supporting the 3d Battalion, 11th Marines, since the latter's arrival in the afternoon of 18 October. The 3d Battalion, 1st Marines relieved the 3d Battalion, 11th Marines, in the morning of 19 October. The 1st Battalion, 1st Marines arrived via truck from WONSAN, and the ROI's returned in the same vehicles. The 1st Marines did provide some combat support to the 3d Battalion. They attached D Battery, 2d Battalion, 11th Marines for artillery support; the 1st platoon of the 4.2" Mortar Company for light indirect fire; and finally, C Company (-) of the 1st Tank Battalion. 1st Marines issued two missions to the 3d Battalion: 1) "Form a defensive position at MAJON-NI, destroy enemy forces, and deny them the use of this central road net" (10) and 2) "patrol roads to north, south, and west and keep the road open between MAJON-NI and WONSAN." (11) After publication of the orders, an oral amendment eliminated the second requirement. The road between WONSAN and MAJON-NI twisted through a 3000 foot pass -- excellent terrain for ambushes. On arrival at MAJON-NI, the 3d Battalion established a perimeter approximately 3400 meters in circumference. The 3d Battalion commander placed the 1st D Battery northward to properly cover any avenue of approach. In the need of reduced control, MAJON-NI was a point of entry for Korean transients. The 1st Battalion, 1st Marines and its attached units processed those individuals to

the day after the first contact, the 1st team was close enough to the road to be hit and killed when a mine exploded at the neck of the bridge. To understand the magnitude of the initial difficult problem, an average kill rate of 52 POWs per kilometer in 17 days of operation in the MAJON-NI area.

(b) Opening Moves. The next two weeks of combat at MAJON-NI revealed that resupply of the battalion could be the central theme. As an immediate step, 3d Battalion established patrol sectors by Companies: C Company on the MONSAM road, H Company on the SEUNG road, and I Company on the primary supply route to PRONGKABO. First combat occurred on the morning of 2 November. At 0900 hours, an unidentified size NVA force ambushed a resupply convoy bound for MAJON-NI. See Figure 4. An "OY flying cover for convoy tried to signal he had spotted road block and for convoy to turn around, but his signal was unobserved or not understood." (12) The Koreans eliminated the center surface of the narrow road, and stopped traffic by dropping small arms, machine gun, and mortar rounds. There was no recourse but return to PRONGKABO. In other, lessened efforts trucks and tanks were destroyed. The 1st Marines responded by sending a command team, lead by five tanks to the scene. The destroyers' firefights dispersed the enemy and forced them to withdraw. But friendly losses were significant: 10 KIA, 15 WIA, and 3 damaged trucks.

the first and most intense NKPA offensive against the Marine platoons. During this action two Marine platoons lost one Marine KIA. There was more fighting in the south that same morning. NKPA elements ambushed a motorized patrol from H Company near YOHAE-RI at approximately 1000 hours. As the attack continued, the platoon sent a jeep back to MADDE-RI. Radio problems delayed external reinforcement, so the 3d Battalion dispatched the remainder of H Company. Artillery fire assisted in this second Marine withdrawal of the day. Losses included 5 KIA and 16 WIA. In both of the days ambushed, enemy losses were undetermined, but light. In a more successful vein, supporting fire was quite effective. Marine Corsairs dispersed the enemy attacking the convoy, and D Battery saved the entangled H Company platoon. Unfortunately, both actions show a general Marine disregard for security. A platoon convoy escort was obviously insufficient to react to an ambush. Intelligence apparently ignored enemy presence or did not have the true picture. In sum, the first day's engagement was an NKPA victory and repeated the familiar trend of attempting to react to disaster, as opposed to proactively gathering forces to meet the threat.

#### 2. Marine Forces in Battle.

Marine Forces in Battle. Marine

The Captain, Second Lt. Fredde, 3d Battalion Commander, held the maneuvering of his closed MSR's. Anticipating the attack, he conducted a successful practice drop on 1 November. The 3d Battalion ordered and received a massive drop at 0900 hours on 3 November that included 21 tons of gasoline, machine, grenades, and artillery shelling. Four Force 667's of the 1st Air Delivery Platoon out of WONSAN airfield dropped 152 parachutes in the MAJON-NI perimeter. While this drop eliminated therefore, he ordered a second convoy to go to MAJON-NI at 1630 hours on 3 November. As the convoy departed WONSON, there were significant communications problems between MAJON-NI and WONSON. Due to the mountainous terrain, radio communications were unreliable. Messages delivered by helicopter and OY became the primary means of communications. Despite these difficulties, the convoy included heavier combat support assets than assigned on the prior day. In the place of an infantry platoon, an entire rifle company (A Company, 1st Battalion) under CPT Robert Barrow joined the supply train. Additionally, 1st Marines included engineers, a section of 81mm mortars, and a three-man rifle section. An OY aircraft insured prompt responsiveness. In a tactical innovation, CPT Barrow placed the engineers and a few of their vehicles at the front of the convoy. This allowed the engineers to assault the enemy from unanticipated directions on their way

At 0600 hours, the commander noted, the NVA struck assembly area, Phu Nhieu, with the OY spotting the enemy on the over ahead, one platoon of infantry left their trucks and engaged the enemy. The fire fight gradually progressed from the lead elements down the left flank of the entire convoy. The OY called for airstrikes, and the Dime section marked enemy positions with white phosphorous. Since this action occurred at 1700 hours, it was dusk and the close air support was only effective in suppressing enemy fire, as opposed to destroying enemy forces and positions. The enemy attack intensified as night dominated the battlefield. In a seemingly impulsive decision, CPT Barrow ordered lights out and the trucks turned around while the infantry units continued covering. While this may have been the only realistic choice, the results were disastrous. One truck went over a cliff with 30 troops aboard; by miracle, no one died as a result of the accident and only 16 were injured. On the other hand, as the Marines escaped the ambush and counted their losses, the head count was discouraging. The mission failed and the Marines reported 2 WIA. Furthermore, five vehicles were lost, including a jeep, personnel carrier, dump truck, and two 1-ton trucks. The losses at this extreme were, once again, unanticipated, and inconceivable. As CPT Barrow returned to his command post and passed at 2000 hours, a 100% failure.

inadequate. The lack of local knowledge and information were not factors, but rather the significant question is who. CDR Pollard had been ordered to conduct another convoy through the MPR without clearing the area with a reconnaissance in force. With the morning's successful airdrop, the 3d Battalion did have a viable, albeit tenuous, supply line. At midnight, the losses of 3 November were assessed. Learning from his mistake, CPT Barrow modified his tactics for the next convoy. Departing MONDAY on 4 November at 0630 hours, he adopted more flexible security measures and regained the tactical initiative. Deploying his infantry platoons on foot, 1000 yards in advance of the lead vehicles, the Marines surprised approximately 70 guerrillas who were leisurely enjoying a late morning breakfast. Turning the tables, the Marines killed 51 NKPA, took 3 POW's, and counted no friendly casualties. The chain of events regarding the resupply operations from 2 to 4 November was typical for the 1st Marines throughout the COMINT-MARCOM-NI operation. Although they could not fulfill their primary mission objectives or convert their superior tactics into a tangible threat, the Marines had adjusted their techniques to the changing requirements. In itself, the cost of the mission was negligible when compared to their performance.

With the mission complete, the 1st Marines returned to the

approximately 0600 hours, 5 November, indicated the HCU-100 had been  
detected by friendly fire detection at NEDON-NI, and much  
of the day was spent in the G-Hounder. The Counter Intelligence  
Squadron Team (CIST) deemed of a probable MI-PA attack on  
the HCU-100 at 0730 hours on 5 November. In response to  
the information, 1st Marines attached A Company, 1st  
Marines Battalion, 2d Marine Division, with the  
Battalion, LTF (Lodge initially strengthened his  
commandership), in a mission that completed for the  
Marines and MACVSHQ, 1st Marines ordered a  
surveillance in force of the TURUH-SAN mine works to  
investigate a buildup of possibly 2000-3000 North  
Koreans. Comprising a test force, 6 and 1 companies  
replied the mission, with combat support from the  
artillery battery at MEGON-NI. Returning at  
approximately 1700 hours on 6 November, the Marines  
detected no recent MI-PA activity. They did gather 70  
enlisted prisoners. With this mission complete, A  
Company returned to regimental control, and 6 and 1  
companies resumed their perimeter defense. In the  
evening, returning home on 7 November, UCPA pt obtained  
support and 1st C-Hound protection. At approximately  
0030 hours, they landed off the nighttime perimeter, and  
at 0100 hrs were ordered to assist in the 454  
Countermeasures flight against the HCU-100, and 52.  
Countermeasures flight, and 1st C-Hound left combat assault to  
TURUH-SAN, and 1st C-Hound left combat assault to

At 0500, the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, attacked the ridge line. The ridge had been heavily held until Marine Company close support mortars and small arms drove the enemy off the ridge line. At 0615 hours the attack ended; this time with a marine victory. While the 1st Battalion had 3 KIA, Marines estimated the enemy loss was 53 killed and 100 wounded. The defender was overestimated; the enemy scattered off their dead and wounded. With the ridge line secured, the foot hills surrounding YUDOGI-RI, 1st Marines detached A Company from the 3d Battalion and raced them to WONSAN. Using a truck company, B Company escorted 619 North Korean POWs to WONSON. In addition to ordering the return of A Company, COL Fuller ordered the 2d Battalion to MUNCHON-NI, an intermediate village near the top of the highest pass on the TOGWAN-MUNCHON-NI road. The 2d Battalion's mission was identical to the 3d Battalion tasks: block enemy movement north and screen civilians. With only enough trucks for one reinforced rifle company, E Company was the first unit of the 2d Battalion to depart UJINNI. At a horseshoe bend 8 kilometers west of YUDOGI, the NVA requested a now familiar favor. Fearing capture, the lead vehicles with a few civilian refugees, the North Koreans trapped the 2d Battalion in a valley. After a brief skirmish, COL Fuller ordered his men to retreat. Without other recourse, the 2d Battalion commander ordered the tanks to fire. From 1000

Marines, 1st Marines sent F Company to reinforce the beleaguered E Company. They arrived at 1615, about the same time A Company's convoy came from the west. By then, the battle was over. Requesting emergency helicopter evacuation, the Marines listed 8 KIA and 27 WIA. Enemy losses were in excess of 40. While absorbing these substantial losses, the Marines did destroy 50 cases of 120mm ammunition and 300 cases of small arms ordnance that the North Koreans left in their hasty retreat. With the action complete, 2d Battalion continued to MUNCHON-NI. In analyzing both the perimeter defense and the E Company convoy, surprise and security were the pivotal principles of war. The forewarned Marines in MAJON-NI successfully beat off the 45th NKPA attack; but the North Koreans badly bloodied the tactically blind and understrength E Company convoy. Reminiscent of KOJO and other convoy operations, the 1st Marines did not adequately protect its forces and waited for disaster before dispatching the required troops. As usual, the reinforcements arrived to find the enemy melting into the hills. Likewise, the 1st Marines used their combat experience from the MAJON-NI perimeter defense and the 4 November convoy. They lapsed back into old ways for the E Company convoy.

(C) Relief at MAJON-NI. The increased combat activity at MAJON-NI concerned the 1st

Marine Compound. On 10 November, C-31 Battery attached the 1st KMC Battalion to T-1, arriving with a small contingent, they assumed the perimeter sector vacated by H Company of the 1st Battalion. That same day, an Orl spotted 300 North Koreans four miles west of MAJON-NI. In a good display of responsive indirect fire, C Battery howitzers dispersed the enemy concentration. Anticipating further NKPA offensives, the CIC warned of another attack on the MAJON-NI perimeter on the night of 11-12 November. This was a correct prediction as the 45th NKPA regiment began their typical probe around 0130 hours on 12 November. The main attack focused on the 3d KMC front, but never developed momentum. The North Koreans wandered into a "Bouncing Betty" minefield that achieved a debilitating effect on the enemy. With the attack ending again at daybreak, Marine losses were two killed and six wounded. At 1030 hours the following morning, the 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, 3d Infantry Division (US) departed WONSAN to relieve the Marines at MAJON-NI. The soldiers, imitating their Marine counterparts, bogged down at each North Korean roadblock and spent the night in a defensive perimeter astride the TOGWAN road. They finally arrived at MAJON-NI at 1530 hours. The 3d Battalion departed for WONSAN at 1615 hours on 14 November. The next day, the 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry relieved 1-1 at MUNCHON-NI. In effect, the

MAJON-NI operations was over for the 1st Marines. The initial losses for the 3d Battalion were 16 KIA, 4 MIA, and 15 WIA against an estimated 525 NKPA dead and unknown number of wounded. This enemy KIA figure is probably grossly inflated due to their lack of reliable body counts. The various supply convoys registered more casualties: 9 killed and 61 wounded. With the relief of its major maneuver battalions, RCT-1 displaced north to CHIGYONG. They were no longer responsible for the WONSAN-MAJON-NI-KOJO area.

(d) Key Events. There were two critical events in the MAJON-NI operations for the 1st Marines: the initial perimeter defense of MAJON-NI on 7 November, and A Company's convoy success on 4 November. The successful perimeter defense demonstrated to the NKPA that the Marine forces in the town itself were well organized and entrenched. The 3d Battalion took advantage of their combat support assets: the D Battery howitzers covered all axes of attack, air strikes interdicted enemy movement during the day, and command civilian and POC interrogations warned the defenders of significant attack. The overwhelming influence of these combat multipliers neutralized the rather negative effects of poor planning and task organization that occasionally ruined supply operations. The only good convoy attempt was the 4

disaster operation under CPT Robert E. Barlow. Adopting the tactics to suit the enemy threat, he wrested the initiative from the NKPA, killed more than 144 North Koreans, and pushed the convoy to its destination safely. After this success, why did the Marines resume their past habit of undermanned, defensive convoys? Eight more Marines died at the horseshoe east of MUNCHON-NI because of a failure to exploit proven tactics. The entire 1st Marine tactical plan was inconsistent. Generally, the key events favored the Marines; but they failed to exploit their tactical advantages in MSR control.

(e) Outcome. There was no clear tactical victory for either force. Both sides accomplished their missions: the Marines kept the MSRs open and massed enormous numbers of POWs. On the other hand, the 15th NKPA Division successfully disrupted Marine supply operations and destroyed a valuable portion of Marine supplies and personnel. Accordingly, both adversaries revealed specific strengths. The North Koreans used the principles of concentration and mobility to maintain tactical advantage over the Marines. They would only fight when they possessed clear numerical superiority; as Marine reinforcements arrived, they terminated the engagement. Although the division was not at full strength, it clearly outnumbered the RCT-1 forces in the WONSAN-MADON-NI

similar to their sister units who fought at Inchon. The 15th NKPA Division had substantial battle experience. They were veterans of the Korean War and CCP operations prior to 1950. They used the terrain to maintain an offensive posture throughout the entire battle. Marine operations displayed the traditional American strengths. The quality and quantity of equipment vastly outclassed the NKPA. Especially in terms of combat support, arrival of US close air support and artillery usually terminated the Korean attacks. Marine morale was noteworthy. Continuously under pressure, they doggedly pursued their objectives. Indeed, perseverance characterized these operations much more than informed analysis of their situation, or innovative response. The Marines survived due to the massive available logistical support. When one logistical convoy failed, the Marines dispatched another one. If the MSR's were temporarily closed, then a massive airdrop similar to the 3 November MAJON-NI resupply was sufficient. The Marines were seldom short of fighting equipment or materiel. Casualties were immediately moved by both armies. The NKPA typically removed their wounded and dead from the battlefield. This habit deceived Marine intelligence of reliable and strength estimates. For emergency cases, the Marines often relied on evacuation helicopters. In fact, the final outcome was a draw. The battle was

and a minor prelude to future operations in the north. They duly trudged north to join Chinese units preparing to attack in force and the Marines wearyly displaced to CHEDONG for yet another mission, another battle, in the same war.

#### b. Analytical

(1) The administrative landings of the 1st Marine Division at WONSAN in October and the actions of the following weeks should have resulted in the largest defeat of NKPA soldiers of the war. However, the successes of prior weeks had bred overconfidence, and the X (US) Corps was oriented to the north for continued success. This opened the left flank and rear of the 1st Marine Division to large numbers of infiltrating NKPA. The realization of this threat to the division rear area resulted in the entire 1st Marine Regiment being dedicated to securing base areas and main supply routes against organized guerrillas and elements of the 5th Division NKPA from 24 October through 10 November. The reactive posture that the 1st Marine Regiment was forced into detracted from the primary mission of the division. Additionally, had the divisor been more attuned to threat capabilities and directed greater attention to the withdrawing enemy power, the flank and rear would not have been exposed. Furthermore, the failure to close the door on the

and the second enemy left a disciplined force to fight again. Analysis of the actions of this brief period of war-free operations assesses immediate and long term benefits. Finally, the lessons learned from the operation are summarized.

(2) The operations conducted by the 1st Marine Regiment were indecisive to the overall conduct of the war. Although the entire regiment was directed to the mission of securing base areas and main supply routes, this did not significantly detract from the tactical mission of the 1st Marine Division's accomplishment of its tactical mission. Consequently, little or no tactical advantage was gained by the NKPA.

(3) The enemy achieved surprise initially at YODO. This is primarily attributed to military intelligence not properly developing the situation. There was insufficient planning time afforded to the regiment or the battalion. This recognition of deficiency does not detract from the question of whether or not there was an urgency for the battalion to deploy to FCIG at that time. It only identifies and reinforces the importance of rapid and correct intelligence as well as the need for sufficient information to be available to tactically employ forces against the external enemy threat.

In the tactical operations were at small scale and brief. The enemy attempted and achieved surprise, infiltration and destruction. Although this is not unlike previous tactics employed, the successes gained were not without significant enemy losses. The most successful reaction to NKPA tactics was the use of air cover to alert convoys to enemy roadblocks on the Middle-KMT MSR. The aerial observer would identify the roadblock and alert the ground commander who would dismount and deploy forces. The air cover would then provide close air support. Initially, there were some coordination problems with this concept. However, with continued use, it was successful in countering subsequent enemy attempts to block the MSR.

(S) The harshest immediate realization for the 1st Marine Division forces was that the NKPA was not defeated. The enemy's ability to strike and inflict significant damage while in full retreat was quickly realized. The threat to the 1st Marine Division rear area was from a very disciplined force conducting an orchestrated withdrawal. It required the effort of the entire 1st Marine Regiment.

(S) Tactically, the actions reinforced the importance of integration of fires and mutually supporting operations. The failure to have artillery or mortars fire on visible infiltrants at 1000 detected


survive defense. Additionally, the defensive preparations were not mutually supporting and afforded little benefit in the overall tactical defense plan. This was probably a result of a lack of intelligence of the enemy; however, it clearly demonstrated the importance for integration of fires and air cover to a mutually supported defense plan.

(7) Significant long term benefits are not obvious. The tactics employed by the enemy were the same in withdrawal as demonstrated during the offensive. It did reinforce the discipline and professionalism of the enemy. Even while in retreat and suffering heavy losses, the NKPA was capable of mounting serious threats to the 1st Marine Division rear areas.

(8) It is no sweeping revelation that surprise can counterbalance superior forces. Inadequate intelligence preparation of the battlefield had permitted the enemy to achieve surprise at KOJO. The need to provide sufficient intelligence and planning time for a force to successfully accomplish a mission is reiterated.

On the other hand, missions should be identified to support the tactical and operational plan. The actions at KODA were the defense of a supply depot that had already been captured. The employment of a force

the same, and I do not believe it would be wise to do either. I have no  
information on the exact number of persons involved, but I estimate about  
2000000 people, mostly Chinese, are involved in this. It is also  
estimated a supply disrupted or accidentally destroyed or  
lost in few days, drains the entire of resources.



## II. ANALYSIS

### A. ANALYSIS OF THE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

(1) Introduction: This report discusses the operational and administrative operations effects upon and by the 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment during the period 15 October 1950 to 10 November 1950. Information concerning the 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment will be given in the following section. Information will be given on the supplies planned and required for these operations, and a brief mention will be made of the problems faced by the opposing forces.

#### (2) Background:

(a) Logistics posed a problem for the 1st Marine Division from the very start of its operations in Northeastern Korea. The original D-Day for the WONSAN landing was set for 15 October 1950. Due to a number of factors, most of which had to do with an underestimation of the difficulty of getting ashore the required 10 days levels of Classes of Supply (COS), the Division's arrival at WONSAN originally slipped to 20 October 1950. The initial base at INCHEON could only handle one ship at a time and there could not be more than six ships at any one port. An attempt would have necessitated the landing of the first assault elements prior to the arrival of the divisional supply ships.

(b) The distances involved added to the  
initial problem. These were as follows:

在這段時間內，我們將會繼續努力，以確保所有參與者能夠充份發揮他們的才能。

Opposite the station 11 26 miles

Opposite the junction 78 miles

(c) The mission assigned to RCT-7 was in the judgment of the area that it was necessary to devote almost the entire 1st Motor Transport Battalion (less 1st Maintenance and Supply Companies) to support that RCT. This action, while essential, left the division short of motor transport assets in an area where almost all traffic was limited to existing road and rail lines. In fact, so vital were the roads to the overall operations in the Chosin Reservoir area that RCT-1's mission was to secure them as NSRs behind the areas of responsibility of RCT-5 and RCT-7. This mission was soon expanded to include the responsibility for security of the 1st Motor Supply Group at KDCO. The 1/1 was dispatched on 10 October 1950, immediately on arrived at KDCO to help the 1/2C to move out their trail.

It is the intent of the Legislature that the State shall have the power to regulate commerce among the several States.

(c) On 26 October, the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Regimental Command Group, arrived at KOJO. They were met by the 1st Battalion, 2nd Regimental Command Group, who had been maintaining supplies and reinforcements. A road train left the next day. A road convoy would be used on 27 October to bring up the rest of the unit. Two carriers, which was left behind due to a shortage of deployment areas at KOJO. Both trains and the road train, arrived at KOJO without incident.

(d) After the surprise attack of the night of 25 October at KOJO, it was necessary to reinforce with 2nd Marines by rail from WONSAN. X Corps, at WONSAN, was requested to assemble a train, at 1000 hours, 26 October. Arrangements were made to use an LST to move 10 tanks by sea because the roads and bridges were too light to support their weight. In response to a request for helicopters to evacuate casualties, a second LSTH was sent to KOJO.

(e) 2/1 went directly from their landing craft, at WONSAN, onto a train on the rail siding, and 3 and 1/2 hours later, with the Regimental Command Group, departed for KOJO. They were followed by a second train to the rear. Both trains reached KOJO at 1000. The 2nd Battalion, 2nd Regimental Command Group, had not yet completed their assembly at KOJO. Five regiments were required to defend the remainder of 1/1 against CO 2/1 on 27 October, so after the initial contact, the 2nd Regimental Command Group would assist 1/1 in repelling CO 2/1's assault. The 2nd Regimental Command Group would be relieved by 1/1 at 1000.

(g) Upon their relief at KOJO on 26 October and 1 November, 1/1 was removed by LST to WONSAN, arriving there at 1230 hours on 2 November. 2/1 moved to WONSAN the next day by road, with most of the soldiers marching and a limited number of trucks being used to move equipment. A railroad train was also used. The decision to march the troops was made for two reasons: a lack of transportation and to keep them moving to prevent frostbite. They completed the 37 mile route in two days, having to halt twice to provide perimeter security for crews repairing the rail line following guerrilla attacks on it.

(h) At this point, responsibility for the rear area security in the area of operations (AO) was passed to the Third Battalion, operating out of MAJON-NI; where they arrived by road transport to relieve the 26th ROK Regiment at 1600 hours, 28 October. The MAJON-NI deployment offered a challenge to logistics planners, since there were no rail connections as there had been at KOJO, and the MSR was a narrow, winding route that rose through a steep pass (2000 ft) early in its 28 mile run. So vulnerable was this road to attack that the mission of 3/1 was quickly amended to include the responsibility for keeping it open. To have done so would have overtaken the entire reorganization of the unit, the existing three-pronged

task of securing the vital road junction at MAJON-NI, and destroying enemy forces in its vicinity.

(ii) As a result of this decision, it became necessary to rely on helicopters for transportation between MAJON-NI and WONSAN, and to resupply by fighting convoys through enemy ambushes on the road. One such convoy was forced back close to WONSAN itself, on 2 November. This led to the first of a total of 377 tons of supplies being dropped by air, using Air Force C-47 aircraft, during the month of November.

(3) The combination of bad roads and enemy action made road resupply of the garrison at MAJON-NI very difficult. It became necessary to provide each convoy with engineers to dismantle roadblocks and infantry to fight off ambushes. Eventually, this procedure seems to have become an accepted method of getting the enemy out into the open, where a counter-ambush could be employed to fix and

destroy them.

The Marines were relieved at 0600 on 11 November by the 1st Battalion, 15th Marine Regiment, 3rd Marine Division (US), which required the Marines to march down the enemy-controlled road

1. ANALYSIS

(1) Transportation and movement were clearly the major logistical problems encountered by the 1st, 2d and 3d Marine battalions in their AO during this period. The Marines displayed great flexibility in their moves from sea to rail and road, and the dispatch of reinforcements from WONSAN to KODO by rail on 28 October in the space of a few hours indicates that the Corps staff had a good grip on the situation. It would appear the Korean and Chinese forces had little access to either motor transport or rail assets; this no doubt had an adverse effect on their ability to concentrate fighting forces, but enabled them to use ambush and infiltration techniques to good effect. The difficulties in passing supplies to fighting troops is remarked on by several commentators, but at no time was this acknowledged to be a serious threat to the success of the mission. The use of airdrops of supplies into MAGON-NI was quite successful in making sure that the minimum amount of supplies needed got through despite the blocked roads; this success may have been due in part to the raids (air strikes) carried out before the drops were actually needed.

(2) Evacuation of wounded troops was used infrequently, even though planes were obviously in existence to move wounded from KODO by LST. This

produced much more efficient morale. Several comments are made in the official special action reports regarding the harmful effect a lack of medical treatment had on the enemy's forces.

(3) A minor difficulty was encountered with water sources at KOJO. There was no problem in this regard at MAJON-NI, where clean water was abundant and a water point soon established.

(4) The cold weather had an adverse effect on personnel, in that several cases of frostbite were reported. Lubrication of weapons was also affected. The grease and oil issued to clean and service personal arms were reported to be not suited for the Korean winter climate.

(5) Analysis of the operations at KOJO and MAJON-NI offers little insight into personnel issues. Enemy forces were in retreat, and their efforts were aimed at regrouping as many of their forces as possible. The limited Marine losses did not cause significant personnel shortages. After action reports concluded that the Marine Corps Personnel System was sound and well adapted to combat conditions. Based on the additional commanding administrative and personnel element information of officers as they gained experience in combat, it is recommended that more

sufficient training in these areas be given to certain Marine officers prior to participation in combat.

(6) The actions around HOD demonstrated the potential importance of civil affairs (CA) in rear area operations. Both refugees and retreating enemy soldiers in civilian clothes were encountered by Marine units in Korea. In addition to the normal requirements for humane treatment of displaced persons demanded by international law and the need to ensure that refugees did not interfere with military operations, the Marines needed to quickly segregate retreating enemy soldiers from the other Korean transients in order to prevent the former from returning to their units in the countryside. To accomplish this task quickly, all transients were "processed" by a Civil Affairs officer. POWs were kept in limited facilities, and since these were strained by the need to err on the safe side when making determinations as to exactly who should be detained, the need for trained and knowledgeable CA personnel was noted.

(7) Strict troop discipline and cooperation with local civilian leaders in the MAJON-NI area produced favorable results for the Marines. Villagers in MAJON-NI were allowed to continue to have their own mayor and council and to follow all customs and laws that did not directly conflict with the Marine mission.

In addition to creating favorable world and local  
opinion, such fair treatment of civilians was highly  
appreciated by local civilians, who warned the Marines of  
impending ILLIN attacks on several occasions.

(E) In conclusion, the logistical and  
administrative procedures carried out by the Marines at  
TOKO and MAGOMBI were both effective and economical.  
While this cannot be said to have played a decisive  
part in the success of the mission, it is clear that  
without such actions, particularly in the areas of  
logistics utilization and civil affairs, the mission  
would not have been done as well.

1. OPERATIONAL AND SIGNAL.

a. Command

(1) Relationships:

(a) The 1st Marine Division was under the operational control of X (US) Corps during this period of operations. The X (US) Corps Commander, General Almond, had his command post in WONSAN from 24 October until 2 November, when he moved it to HAMHUNG. The 1st Marine Division Commander was Major General Smith. From the USS Mount McKinley, his division command post moved to a location a mile north of WONSAN on 27 October, and then to HUNGNAM on 4 November. The Assistant Division Commander was Brigadier General Edward A. Craig.

(b) The formation of self-sustaining Regimental Combat Team (RCT) task organizations was the normal rule rather than the exception at this time. The term "detachment" was used with these task organizations in order to allow flexibility to the RCT in changes of size and composition of the various detachments as required by the situation and available transportation.

(c) RCT-1 was commanded by Colonel Fullen. He had three battalions under him: 1st

initially. 1st Marines commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Jack Hawkins; 2d Battalion, 1st Marines commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Alan Sutter; and 3d Battalion, 1st Marines commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas L. Rudder. Upon landing at WONSAN, the 1st Battalion initially moved to KOJO, the 2d Battalion remained at WONSAN, and the 3d Battalion moved to MAJON-NI.

(2) Locations:

(a) 1st Battalion was in the vicinity of KOJO at 1700 hours on 27 October. The command post was located on the slopes north of two platoons from A Company (Figure 1). B Company was in an outpost position two miles south and southwest of KOJO. 1st Platoon of B Company was located on the east slope of Hill 109, 2d Platoon was on Hill 185, and 3d Platoon and Company Headquarters were on the high ground west and south of 1st Platoon. C Company was in position a mile and a half north of B Company in a line of knollies in the hills with the platoons arranged with 3d Platoon, 1st Platoon, and 2d Platoon respectively from west to east. A Company had its 2d and 3d platoons located 225 meters east of C Company and 1st Platoon located at Hill 117. F Battery, 11th Marines, the artillery support, was located on the beach northeast of KOJO. When B Company was attacked during the night of 27 October, it withdrew from its outpost

position, and it demanded a 360 degree defense on both sides of the railway track just south of CHONCHON-NI.

(b) On 28 October, due to the attack on the previous night, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines was sent to KOJO from WONSAN. The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines and the 3rd PNC Battalion were then attached to the 1st Marine Division to patrol the roads in the WONSAN area and maintain blocking positions at ANBYON. They remained attached until 2 November when they detached to comply with new orders.

(c) From 28 to 31 October, 1st and 2d Battalions, 1st Marines occupied positions in a semicircle around Hill 117 at KOJO. Each rifle company set up outposts in front of its zone. At 0700 hours on 1 November, 1st Battalion left KOJO from WONSAN by LST. On 2 November they took up positions at the road block near KATSUMA, four miles southeast of WONSAN. 2d Battalion and the artillery battery stayed in KOJO until 3 November when they returned to WONSAN.

(d) Third Battalion, 1st Marines plus its attached elements were located in MAJON-NI on 28 October. The battalion command post was located in the schoolhouse (Figure 3). A battalion perimeter was established with daytime company observation posts and the patrolling of the three main roads which intersected in the town. C Company was responsible for

the road to HOKKAN, H Company the road to SEOUL, and I Company the road to PYONGYANG.

(e) On 5 November, A Company, 1st Battalion was assigned as the guard to a truck convoy bringing supplies from WONSAN to the 3d Battalion at MAJON-NI. After its arrival, Colonel Fuller placed it under the operational control of the 3d Battalion for defense because an attack was expected that night. The three rifle platoons and their reinforcing elements were assigned a sector between G and H Companies on the perimeter. The next day, 6 November, A Company returned to WONSAN and 1st Battalion control.

(f) On 6 November, 2d Battalion (-) was ordered by Colonel Fuller to go to MUNCHON-NI via the HA DHU-NI road. The mission was to block enemy movement along the trails leading north and to screen civilians. The 3d RMC Battalion arrived at MAJON-NI on 10 November as reinforcements. It was assigned to the sector in the perimeter where A Company, 1st Battalion had been on 5-6 November.

(g) On 13 November elements of the 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, U.S. 3d Infantry Division arrived in MAJON-NI to take over the perimeter defense. At 1015 on 14 November, the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines left MAJON-NI for WONSAN.

On 14 November, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, moved to CHIGDONG, eight miles southwest of HANYANG. The 2d Battalion arrived at CHIGDONG on 15 November, and the 3d Battalion on 17 November. With these movements, the 1st Marine Division reached a relative degree of concentration with the resultant distance between elements being less than 30 miles.

(2) Analysis: There were no command relationship problems associated with this operation. The RCT-type organization provided a flexible organization for combat. Units could be attached and detached without problem. The manner in which this was done met the changing circumstances of the operation. Span of control of the number of subordinate units was well within the parameters for effective management. The physical span of control caused significant problems for the commanders involved because of the abnormal distances between units. The operation orders and alerts that placed these units in such a widespread distribution were executed rather quickly based on the rapidly changing situation in Korea. If more time for planning and coordination had been available, RCT-1 might have been given the mission to protect an empty supply depot.

3. Appendix

(1) Task Organization:

(a) Prior to landing at WONSAN:

1st Marine Division

1st Sig Bn, less detachments  
Carrier Flt, FMFPac  
Det, 4th Sig Bn  
2d Sig Rep Unit  
Det, 205 Sig Rep Co  
RPT, RTT Team

RCT-1

Det. 1st Sig Bn  
Sig Co (O-5)  
AMBL100

(b) After the landing at WONSAN:

1st Marine Division

1st Sig Bn, less detachments  
Carrier Flt, FMFPac

RCT-1

Det, 1st Sig Bn

(2) Planning and Operations: The 1st Marine Division was assigned a zone of action 300 miles north-south by 60 miles east-west. RCT-1 was assigned responsibility for the KOJO-WONSAN-MAJON-NI area. These certainly represented abnormal distances for communications. Some distances to keep in mind are:

WONSAN to KOJO - 39 miles

WONSAN to MAJON-NI - 28 miles

WONSAN to HAMHUNG - 78 miles

In addition to the distances involved, the terrain was extremely mountainous. In order to communicate, RCTs were supplemented with high power signal company and signal battalion radios. The amplitude modulated (AM) continuous wave (CW) radios had tailored antennae cut

from the Headquarters on which they were to operate. This  
was typical. Division operated two to three divisional  
command nets, usually directly to RCTs or battalions.  
Additionally, the 1st Marine Division operated an  
alternative net to the naval shore station to handle  
higher-priority message traffic. This was  
inefficient because of the delays trying to get  
communications messages through the X Corps nets. Wire  
was not a practical solution to communications  
requirements except for intra-DP communications.  
Extreme importance was placed on radio relay and  
helicopter air messenger service. Because the 1st  
Marine Division was working with the army, X Corps  
assigned blocks of frequencies and callsigns. At KOJO,  
RCT-1 was assigned a detachment of ANGLICO to control  
and coordinate naval gun fire.

(3) Analysis:

(a) RCT-1's Special Action Report  
indicates that the regimental communications were  
initially adequate, but that communication to division  
was only possible through the attached signal element in  
the division.

(b) Equipment: Many of the batteries  
operated organizational radios only worked if the  
transmitter and receiver were aligned. In most cases there


initial equipment failures but there was also damage to  
communications equipment. At KOJO four pieces of  
communications equipment which were last verified  
functioned, but all had been burned and were unusable.  
This is an indication that the North Korean forces were  
well aware of our dependence on communications. At  
WONJAE there were references to the last operational radio  
and to having to combine parts of two radios to  
re-establish communications. Adequate spares and  
maintenance were both significant problems, as well as  
the transportation problems associated with moving  
equipment in and from the nearest repair facility.


(c) Effectiveness: There were numerous  
instances cited of poor air-to-ground communications  
and misunderstandings of signals between ground  
personnel and FAC's. Delays in messages were extremely  
common. The message of the fight at KOJO had to be  
relayed to the 1st Marine Division by the 7th Marines.  
The 1st Marines requested that instructions be  
forwarded by both radio and air messenger. Messages  
concerning help and air support from an adjacent unit,  
the 143rd FA, had been delayed. Even the radio  
communications between MAJON-NI and WONJAE were  
inadequate and for a few hours at night because of the  
lack of maintenance made it surrounding 3/1st Marines.

(d) Equipment: Generally, communications

level, and the division and the regiments were  
separately. This led to difficulties in the higher  
headquarters determining what actions were occurring at  
the regimental levels. This also caused delays in  
responding to situations as they developed at the  
remote ambush sites. In many areas, the communications  
problems experienced in Korea in 1950 will still exist  
in rear area operations today. Long distances,  
silence or radio, inability to use wire,  
susceptibility of radio to jamming, and guerrilla  
interdiction will cause significant problems for the  
units conducting rear area operations.

- ... and Huntress, Lynn, U.S.  
ARMED FORCES IN KOREA, Vol III  
Headquarters, U.S. Marine  
Corps, p. 48.
1. Ibid., p. 48.
2. Ibid., p. 48.
3. Ibid., p. 48.
4. Ibid., p. 48.
5. Ibid., p. 54.
6. Ibid., p. 54.
7. Ibid., p. 54.
8. Ibid., p. 55.
9. Ibid., p. 61.
10. Ibid., p. 61.
11. Ibid., p. 61-62.
12. Annex "Peter Peter" to 1st Marine Division  
Special Action Report (Yongch'on, Korea:  
Headquarters, 1st Marines, (Reinf), 15 Jan  
1951), p. 7.







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
## **WOTOR-ON FUNCTIONS**

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